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Youth, Governance and the City: Towards a Critical 
Urban Sociology of Youth Crime and Disorder Prevention
Matt Bowden
Introduction
The public debate in Ireland about anti-social behaviour orders (ASBOs)  in the two 
years since the publication  of the Criminal Justice Bill 2004 has raised to prominence 
the question of how young people are policed and governed.1 Critical commentators 
saw the ASBOs as a retrograde step in the light of the welfarist-restorative principles 
underlying the provisions of the Children Act 2001 (O’Mahony 2005; Bacik, 2005). 
The political rhetoric spun in the debate emphasised the need to protect the community 
from certain behaviour in public, mainly but not exclusively by young people. 
Alongside this, there has also been a growing demand in Ireland for high technology 
surveillance in private and public spaces.2 
A variety of legislative and policy changes are currently in gestation in Ireland 
which highlight the need for discussion and debate as to the ‘politics of community 
safety’, all the more so since such developments are likely to encourage a realignment 
of governance nationally and locally.3 In addition, there is a consensus on utilising local 
authority structures on which to graft a national crime prevention strategy (National 
Crime Council, 2003). Some of these developments signal a reconfiguration between 
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the central state and ‘the local’ and as such a discussion of crime and disorder 
prevention, as it pertains to the city as a locale, is fitting at this point.
My intention in this article is to analyse the emergence of youth crime and 
disorder prevention from a perspective that draws on a critically informed urban 
political economy. The reason for this type of analysis is primarily that youth crime 
prevention strategies in Ireland have to a considerable degree been mobilised in 
response to social disorder in specific urban locales and have been represented in media 
as being associated with working class housing estates. Hence this article will focus 
specifically upon youth crime and disorder prevention as a set of combined actions by 
state and civil society actors in specific urban contexts. Youth crime and disorder 
prevention has largely been under-analysed in the Irish context apart from the 
occasional evaluation or descriptive account (Bowden 1998; Bowden and Higgins 
2000; Quinn 2002; Seymour 2003). A critical perspective is offered in this article in an 
attempt to counterbalance the weight and influence of analyses based upon positivistic, 
risk factor modalities (see Kirton, 2005: 292). The dominance of the risk paradigm has 
given rise to ‘prevention experiments’ premised upon intervening to disrupt a ‘criminal 
career’ (see Farrington, 1982; 1994; 1996). Such approaches sit well with the politics of 
‘zero tolerance’ and ‘fixing broken windows’ policies (see Kelling and Coles, 1996) 
and raise the spectre of actuarial social control whereby subsets of the population 
become ‘targets’ for surveillance and ‘profiling’ based upon abstract risk categories 
(see Castel, 1991). The article aims to build upon Wacquant’s (2001) critical account of 
youth disorder in the city and on Garland’s (2001) outline of the punitive discourses 
that take hold in late modern, developed societies. Thus this article might best be 
viewed as a process of the naming of issues as a prelude to further practice, research 
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and debate among practitioners and academics alike. The particular focus is on the 
historical and socio-spatial conditions that gave rise to the Garda Youth Diversion 
Projects (previously known as the Garda Special Projects). The article then critically 
examines the question as to whether we are now entering a new mode of urban 
governance in which the state has rallied a range of actors in pursuit of ‘retaking’ of 
spaces in the city. To help cast some light on this I have drawn from a longitudinal 
qualitative research project involving interviewing and participant observation over an 
eight year period.4 In addition, I have brought together a diverse literature, both 
theoretical and empirical, from criminology, urban sociology and Irish urban studies, to 
conjoin a critical urban perspective with a criminological and sociological approach.
Governance and the City: Some Theoretical Considerations
In this section, I sketch a conceptual framework for an understanding of crime control 
and urban governance; and briefly discuss urban political economy and how it might 
apply in this field.
Governance: Partnerships, Restructuring and Welfare
The last decade has seen a marked growth of both national and local crime prevention 
initiatives in Ireland (see Seymour, 2003). Some of these initiatives take the form of an 
array of local ‘partnerships’ that appear to represent a shift towards a model of network 
governance at local level. Commentators such as Crawford (1997) have suggested that 
this mode of governance rests upon appeals to a particular ideology of community that 
gives privileged access to decision-making to local elites and hence enables powerful 
interests to construct the content and form of crime prevention.5 In this way, they 
‘reinforce power differentials and associated processes of exclusion’ (Crawford, 1997: 
3
224). Such partnerships have been referred to by Garland (2000; 2001) as being part of 
a process of responsibilisation and a dimension of a late modern ‘crime complex’.6 
From this perspective, partnerships in the area of crime control are a means of 
extending the power of the state while it is simultaneously in the process of reducing its 
size and function (Garland, 1996). Garland’s (2001) overall point is that governments 
have restructured penal and crime control regimes in order to govern the poor and those 
marginal to labour markets at a greater distance.
Garland has been criticised on the grounds that his analysis has limited 
application outside of the Anglo-American world:  Kilcommins et al. (2004) conclude 
that despite Ireland’s vulnerability to policy transfer from the UK and US, the ‘crime 
complex’ has only appeared in a ‘dilute and distinctive hybrid form’ (2004: 291). More 
recently however, the Fianna Fáil / Progressive Democrat (PD) coalition has embarked 
upon a series of criminal justice ‘reforms’, including the provision of ASBOs (or 
‘Behaviour Orders’ as they are termed in the Criminal Justice Act 2006) that marks a 
shift towards a greater emphasis on discipline.7 Despite the limited applicability of 
Garland’s ‘culture of control’ thesis, a punitive turn on the part of the state is 
nevertheless discernable.
While some have suggested the existence of a new ‘dense institutional web’ of 
governance whereby areas left behind by global processes are re-institutionalised by 
partnership structures (Saris et al., 2002), the nature of the Irish state differs 
substantially from the one presented in Garland’s version of the ‘governmentality 
thesis’ (see Foucault, 1977). Hence it may be necessary to look at the nature of 
discipline in Irish society through a different lens. As such, an understanding of the 
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‘glocalisation’ of the Irish state is central to an appreciation of the context for youth 
crime prevention.
Globalisation, Governance and the Irish State
New forms of governance may reflect the drive to restructure society and economy in 
Ireland as a means of underpinning the country’s international competitiveness. Bob 
Jessop has pointed out that the emergence of a more ‘flexibilised’ and re-scaled national 
space followed the decline of the Fordist-Keynesian state8 and the development of a 
post-Fordist production paradigm whereby the state has been ‘encouraged to focus on 
the supply–side problem of international competitiveness and to attempt to subordinate 
welfare policy to the demands of flexibility’ (Jessop, 1994: 262). This, according to 
Jessop, has required a ‘hollowing out’ of the state’ that has included the ceding of 
power to supranational bodies and devolving functions downwards to partnerships: in 
the spatial rescaling process there is thus a de-centring of the state (Rose and Miller, 
1992) and a shift from government to governance (Jessop, 1994: 272). Thus the ‘spatial 
disorder’ that is created requires a new ‘institutional fix’ (Peck and Tickell, 1994). A 
drive towards competitiveness such as has happened in Ireland necessarily involves a 
degree of disciplining as economic and social restructuring entails a new realism 
regarding expectations: this serves then to reinforce an ideology that eschews the 
institutionalisation of the welfare state. In their consideration of the position of one 
peripheral housing area, Bartley and Saris (1999) point out that in the context of the 
need for international competitiveness, the Irish welfare state has been rolled back and 
welfare spending diverted towards economic restructuring. Consequently, ‘welfare 
recipients [were] identified as the source of their own unemployment and poverty 
problems, and as such, [were] becoming targets of criticism’ (1999: 82). Part of that 
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process of restructuring has involved labour market supply side measures which area-
based partnerships have sought to provide (Bartley and Saris 1999; Geddes, 2000).
Ireland’s ‘institutional fix’ has been quite an eclectic mix of neo-corporatism 
together with a key developmental role for the state and its agencies. O’Riain (2000) 
has referred to this as the ‘flexible developmental state’ (FDS); it differs from 
bureaucratic, authoritarian and politically repressive ‘tiger’ economies in Asia (see 
O’Hearn, 1999: 9) by virtue of embedded and autonomous developmental agencies 
such that the FDS constitutes a ‘networked polity’:
In transforming itself to operate within a locally and globally networked 
economy and polity, state governance itself is ‘rescaled’ as the prior privileged 
role of the national level gives way to a ‘glocal’ form of state (O’Riain, 2000: 
166-167).
This networked, glocal polity is underpinned by a neoliberal ideology. This ‘liberal 
creed’ is manifested in the low tax, wage restraint and reduced social spending policy 
mix of the Fianna Fáil / Progressive Democrats coalition and a persistent illusion of the 
hegemony of the market (O’Riain, 2004: 28). This ‘creed’ may be the basis of Ireland’s 
version of the ‘exclusive society’ (Young, 1999) as the protection of new wealth 
becomes a driver for mobilising new security technologies and a hardening attitude to 
those marginal to, or indeed outside of, production and consumption markets.
Urban Political Economy
6
Urban political economy has been concerned with analysing ways in which social space 
integrates with economic production and the ideologies supporting and underpinning 
that production. In analysing the layers of urban structure, Castells (1977; 1978) has 
suggested that the economic sub-structure revolves around relations to the labour 
market, the means of production, property and technology. The political-institutional 
apparatus organises space around two relations: (i) domination-regulation and (ii) 
integration-repression; in this regard, the institutional system segregates and officialises 
space while the ideological apparatus organises space by denoting it with a ‘system of 
signs’ (1977: 126). Hence the state and its control apparatuses need to be seen as 
permeating space as a means of organising and integrating it with capitalist production. 
The ‘urban question’ thus revolves, inter alia, around how residential space becomes 
integrated with the productive sphere, and so on. This question then revives itself for 
each productive generation, as argued by Brenner (2000), as a two- sided social and 
political problematic: first, the contradictions of capitalism are produced and fought out 
in the spatial arena; and second, the urban question involves interpretation and struggle 
in the life world of citizens (Brenner, 2000: 362).
An understanding of social and political phenomena such as youth crime 
prevention, and urban crime control more generally, can be enhanced by an 
appreciation of the dialectic between the physicality of the city and urban relationships, 
or between the urban as a thing (its physical form) and the urban as a process (delete) 
(Harvey, 1997). Hence youth crime and disorder prevention needs to be understood in 
terms of its embeddedness in a locale together with the conflicts and coalitions endured 
and formed as an urban process. My main point here is to establish the idea that the 
socio-historic juncture bringing about advanced levels of urban marginality led to urban 
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disorder (see Wacquant 1993a; 1993b; 1996; 1999) and modes of policing and 
prevention also arose in that context. 
Historical Context I: Peripherality, Invisibility and Marginality in the Dublin 
‘New Towns’
In the 1980s and 1990s, population and settlement trends in the Dublin region, were 
influenced by a combination of market factors such as higher land prices in the city 
centre; policy factors such as the housing allocation policies and house building 
strategies; and tax and stamp duty incentives for private sector house purchasers (Drudy 
and MacLaran, 1994). This outward shift has also been explained as the result of the 
destructuring of the traditional industries and the containerisation of Dublin port (Drudy 
and Punch 2000; Drudy and Walker 1996). The running down of the inner city acted as 
a push factor that encouraged the out-movement of younger families leading to the 
skewing of the age profile of new suburbs (ibid., 11-12). A considerable level of 
population dispersal in Dublin resulted, leading to the Dublin region having an 
extended periphery and a relatively contracted core (CSO 2003; Drudy 1991; Drudy 
and MacLaran 1994; Drudy and Punch 2000; MacLaran 1993;). Over a twenty-one year 
period from 1981 to 2002 the new suburban areas continued to grow relative to the 
declining trend in the municipal area, together with the development of housing estates 
on agricultural land in the county area.9 
The two specific peripheral areas of North Clondalkin and West Tallaght were 
on the receiving end of this population dispersal: in the former the process had already 
begun by the late 1970s and growth in the latter began to surge during the 1980s. By the 
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turn of the century, population growth had appeared to level off in North Clondalkin, 
leaving it with an increase of 65% over the twenty year period. Starting later, the 
population of West Tallaght continued to grow during the 1990s and grew by 200% in 
twenty years as shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Population Change in selected urban peripheral locations 1981-200210
Peripheral Area Population 
1981
n
Change 
1981-1991
n (%)
Change
1981-2002
n (%)
West Tallaght11 6,926 16,786
(142.4)
21,333
(205.1)
North Clondalkin12 12,419 20,915
(68)
20,487
(65)
Source: CSO Census of Population, Vol.1, 1981, 1986, 1991, 2002.
As a more general indication of population growth at the periphery, the ‘New Town’ of 
Tallaght had a population of 8,707 persons in 1971. This had increased by 432% to 
46,366 by 1979, and to over 56,000 by 1981: growth over the decade of roughly 500% 
(CSO, 1981, 1986). This rapid outward expansion amounted to a complete reordering 
of Dublin city during this period, as planning attempted to to accommodate economic 
expansion based on the recommendations of the Myles Wright (1967) plan. However, 
the ‘New Town’ planning experiment was a failure. First, the New Towns created 
social environments that were worse than the ones they purported to replace as they 
‘accentuated social segregation’ (Bartley, 1999: 233); and second, the creation of 
transport corridors around the new towns and the screening of local authority housing 
estates from passing view, contributed to a sense of their ‘invisibility’ (ibid).
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According to two urban and regional analysts, such failures went beyond errors 
of planning practice, but were ingrained in the 1937 Constitution’s underpinning of the 
structural position of the Irish propertied class. Thus the appreciation in land values 
could not be used for social gain which was
…eventually to be paid for by the working class through hugely inflated land 
prices. This became reflected in higher than necessary housing plot prices and 
resulted in a reduced capacity of the local authority to fund adequate community 
facilities (MacLaran and Punch, 2004: 36).
Local authority social housing policy in Ireland adds a set of complicating factors to the 
mix. First, such housing provision has been residual in character, part of the welfare 
safety net (O’Connell and Fahey, 1999: 37).13 Second, social order problems 
contributed to the poor reputation of so-called ‘problem estates’ (ibid.: 34). A third 
complicating factor resulted from a political misadventure by the Irish state in the form 
of the Surrender Grant Scheme which provided incentives to the most economically 
advantaged tenants to shift to the private sector. In the process this undermined the 
economic stability of the estates and rendered a damaging blow to the sector generally 
(O’Connell and Fahey, 1999: 40).
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The New Towns After Fordism-Keynesianism
The capacity of the state to rescue the urban periphery from these various complications 
was seriously undermined by the end of the Keynesian economic welfare model and the 
Fordist production paradigm that supported it. In this context welfare spending would 
have to be kept within strict limits. The structural position of the urban peripheral 
housing estates was compounded by the failure of the Irish state at the time to resolve a 
glaring contradiction resulting from the post-1958 industrialisation policy, namely that 
the Dublin working class was further undermined by the type of jobs lost after the 
dismantling of protectionism and the type of jobs created after industrialisation. These 
required higher levels of skill and were dispersed over a wider geographical scale 
(Whelan, Breen and Whelan, 1992: 118-9). The peripheral estates and the new towns 
became the physical manifestation of a contradiction between a planning model that 
sought to cater for expanding pools of labour power and an industrial development 
policy that favoured dispersal. Hence, as Brenner (2000) has pointed out, the urban 
question was being played out as this contradiction manifested itself in everyday 
conflicts over order. The high unemployment that existed at this time together with the 
undermining and greater residualisation of the peripheral housing estates created the 
conditions for clashes between the police and young people and led to a greater sense of 
state insecurity. It is to these events I now turn.
Historic Context II: The Events at Ronanstown and the Interdepartmental Group 
on Urban Crime and Disorder
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A stolen car driven down Neilstown Road on Tuesday November 19th 1991 travelled to 
a piece of open ground and the young drivers alighted. The police officers who pursued 
the vehicle were pelted with stones and when a fire engine arrived on the scene it too 
was subjected to stone-throwing by a large group of young people. Six fire fighters 
received injuries from the stone-throwing as they attempted to deal with the fires at 
Neilstown Drive.14  These events were carried as a main item of news the following 
morning on the radio and they made headlines in the various print media in the 
following days. 
Within a week the Minister for Justice addressed an adjournment debate in Dáil 
Éireann on ‘Violence and Vandalism in Dublin’s Suburbs’ during which he announced 
that he had set up the Interdepartmental Group on Urban Crime and Disorder 
(IGUCD).15 While the establishment of the Group had been drawn out over a protracted 
period, it was this one key event at Ronanstown that catalysed matters.16  
The Group examined the Neilstown/Ronanstown area and its analysis then 
provided a framework to be applied to all urban areas in Ireland with policing 
problems.17 While the Group appeared to rely upon ‘commonsense’, its report did point 
out that the disorder was associated with the history of the peripheral areas in question. 
The characteristics of such areas they listed as being ‘single class’, having no amenities 
and lacking in access to services (Government of Ireland, 1993: 15). The ‘problem’, as 
stressed throughout the report, was to do with the dynamic between displacement and 
settlement in this newly created urban context in which a young population was 
decanted from the inner city to ‘the middle of nowhere’ (1993: 51).
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The Group’s analysis of the incidents at Ronanstown on the 19th of November 
1991 had less to do with crime per se and more to do with the broader concern for 
social order, as the report argued that the problem was attributable to young people’s 
congregations and ‘stone throwing’ resulting in the intimidation of the ‘law abiding
majority’ (1993: 26). Moreover:
Underlying this concern is the perception that authority itself appears to be 
under attack and a fear that, unless the trend is “nipped in the bud”, all of the 
conventions on which ordered society is based will be put in jeopardy with 
extremely serious consequences for society as a whole (1993: 26) [emphasis 
added].
Thus the measures that flowed from this and other similar statements in the IGUCD 
report have to be seen as an attempt to achieve social integration by seeking to 
reconstruct the ‘conventions’ that would restore or reproduce social order. According to 
the report, the situation at Ronanstown, were it to be repeated elsewhere, would have 
resulted in the breakdown of order in urban society as a whole. Hence the volatility of 
the situation at Ronanstown represented a threat to the social order but because it was 
seen as symptomatic of what was happening in other urban peripheries around Ireland, 
a wider threat was posed to economic recovery generally.
In stating its definition of the situation the Group pointed out in a number of 
paragraphs that it was a criminally-inclined minority that manipulated a law-abiding 
majority. In this regard, they proffered the theory that the problem was the result of the 
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manipulation by deviant Others. No evidence was offered for this apart from the police 
view, which the Group accepted:
The Gardaí advised us that a tendency toward the emergence from time to time 
of general disorder problems involving groups of youngsters can be attributed to 
a significant extent to the presence of a small hard core of criminals who incline 
towards the view that (a) authority in all forms (Gardaí, fire services, etc.) 
should be ‘taken on’ and (b) that the local community should be made to 
understand that it is this hard core rather than the authorities who hold the upper 
hand (1993: 23) [emphasis added].
It followed then that a strategy of persuasion was necessary to wrest power from the 
‘hard core’. It needed to convince the community that disorder was located with the 
hard core group and by a logical extension, order would be restored by the state in that 
it would or should reassert the ‘upper hand’. Two strategies were implied by this. The 
first of these was to minimise the power of criminally-inclined young people through a 
process of selective incapacitation (see Garland, 1993). The second was that of some 
form of pedagogic action was required on the part of the state in order to mobilise 
community sentiment in its favour.18 Hence while at a surface level the state responded 
with hard and soft policy options, it simultaneously entered into a form of symbolic 
struggle over its own legitimacy. The form of public policing thus became ‘symbolic 
policing’ (Loader, 1997) or a process of reinstating the symbols of the state where these 
were absent (for a discussion of this mobilisation in the case of French cities, see Body-
Gendrot 2000; Crawford 2002). 
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The Group recommended the extension of a number of situational crime 
preventive measures like roundabouts on roads to ‘design out’ joyriding from the 
physical landscape. Alongside these, they extended the persuasive strategies deployed 
by the GRAFT project in Ronanstown.19 Hence the Garda Youth Diversion Projects 
(GYDPs) were conceived in the context of an emerging urban crisis. State and civil 
society actors may indeed have been mobilised in response to these events at 
Ronanstown in order to pre-empt any deepening of such a crisis. Moreover, the remit of 
the GYDPs was framed in the context of the need for reclaiming the city from the 
young people who occupied the open spaces. In the housing estates, the open spaces 
were the only option young people had for a public sphere at that time. But more 
importantly, the young people involved in the clashes with the police represented a 
wider urban contradiction and so this may have added to the urgency with which the 
state responded.
The emphasis upon achieving state upper-handedness in the IGUCD report was 
a call for the mobilisation of both state and civil society actors as a (re)establishment of 
sovereign power over newly-urbanised space. Significantly, in this instance the 
Department of Justice stepped in as a last resort to co-ordinate a global response to the 
problem of order. The economic and social conditions in Ireland at that time 
precipitated such a response: the provision of welfare-based solutions appeared to be 
out and an extension of justice-based solutions appeared to be in.20
15
Case Study: Youth Crime and Disorder Prevention after the IDGUCD Report
In this section I present a case study based on interviews carried out with practitioners, 
police and other state personnel in 1999 focused upon one Garda Youth Diversion 
Project in the peripheral area of Ballynew (area and interviewee names are fictional). 
The area has a population of about 20,000 persons in four main housing estates. The 
GYDP was hosted by a youth service run by a regional youth organisation. In 
Ballynew, the GYDP worked very closely with the Gardaí. The senior youth worker 
Willie and his colleague John, the paid co-ordinator of the GYDP, met with the police 
every two weeks or so. In addition, John said that he had reason to contact the local 
station almost every day. Both police officers and the youth workers co-operated jointly 
to respond to actual or potential public order issues and often contacted each other to 
decide who would be the most appropriate party to respond. Local people were often 
advised by the police to approach the GYDP co-ordinator if they experienced public 
order issues associated with congregations of young people. After that, the GYDP co-
ordinator was despatched to persuade young people to move elsewhere as Willie 
explained:
John would probably go over [and] probably try and identify who is in the 
group and then go and have a word. And the word would probably be from the 
point of view of ‘listen lads, okay you want to have a bit of crack or a bit of fun 
but do you realise that obviously you are rubbing some people up the wrong 
way and would you not consider doing your drinking a hundred yards further 
down the road where you’ll get no hassle from the community, ‘cause if you sit 
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here and there are complaints being booked like, the Guards are going to get 
‘round eventually and one or two of you is going to get hurt’.  So that’d be the 
starting point. (Willie, senior youth worker, Ballynew)
In this context the youth service brought to the policing function a pedagogic form in 
that it sought to actively persuade young people to congregate elsewhere or not 
congregate at all. It also sent out general house-to-house communications with a view 
to responsibilising parents. John explained how the youth service dealt with a particular 
situation:
Now we got rid of that simply by we done a leaflet up here ourselves and we 
asked a couple of questions, you know, we sent it round to all the doors.  ‘Do 
you know where your child is?  Do you know that there is a huge increase in 
blah blah blah’ and now by really sending that leaflet around in [the two 
housing estates] the problem virtually disappeared. (John, Ballynew GYDP Co-
ordinator)
Here a ‘cultural arbitrary’ was imparted (Bourdieu, 1977) whereby young people and 
children should be under the gaze of their parents. In addition, the Ballynew GYDP 
took on a panoptic function whereby if young people were not under the gaze of their 
parents it would act in that capacity itself. The Ballynew GYDP then worked with the 
police to ensure that the effect of young people appearing in public was dissipated by 
reattaching them to family, school or work and in the absence of these institutions to 
incorporate them in some form of activity. In this regard, youth work extended into the 
domain of crime and disorder prevention, and in this instance acted as a surrogate 
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institution. The welfare of young people and their engagement in the public sphere was 
secondary to the impact of their behaviour and the disorderly potential of their play and 
spontaneous gatherings. In essence the youth service here extended a gaze over the 
area, and by logical extension, it spread the panoptic gaze of the network of agencies to 
which it was loosely attached. Hence rather than being an end delivery agency for a 
programme of welfare, the host youth service became the front end of a system of 
network governance whereby a criminal justice gaze could be cast over a wider area 
and over those who had no prior status in the justice system.
The Contemporary Context for Youth Crime and Disorder Prevention
What follows is a more contemporary analysis of the city as the conceptual backdrop to 
the emergence of a more recent tendency towards surveillance. 
The Information Age, the City and the Taming of Nature
Dublin city centre has become a major site of consumption and there has been an 
attempt to redefine a centre through urban restoration most clearly expressed in the 
redevelopment of O’Connell Street (Corcoran, 2004). Since the 1990s, greater use has 
been made of public order legislation to remove poor and marginal people from the 
streets (see O’Donnell and O’Sullivan, 2001). This mirrors efforts by cities across 
Europe to revitalise and re-brand the city as a destination for tourism and capital 
investment (see Coleman 2003). In addition, the residential transformation of Dublin 
city centre has seen the invasion of a new and youthful urban middle class (Kelly and 
MacLaren, 2004) which has ushered in a pattern of development that Smith (1994) has 
referred to as ‘urban revanchism’.21 Property supplement writers have encouraged the 
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pioneers of this ‘new frontier’ (Smith, 1994) to retake residential areas where they will 
find the ‘best bargains’ or if they ‘want to show real gains, (to) look on the 
margins’ (O’Connor, 2003). So despite any redesignation of the city as distinct cultural 
zones or ‘moral regions’ (Park, 1925) a new entrepreneurship has grown up around the 
revalorisation of city spaces based upon their actual and potential market value. 
Elsewhere, such an urban process has been linked with the ‘hardening of the surface’ of 
the city towards the poor and marginal who are both priced and designed out of 
residential property and the new ‘castles of consumption’ (Davis, 1990). 
The peripheral housing estates have remained largely in the same condition as 
before: they have both literally and metaphorically been ‘by-passed’ by the ‘Celtic 
Tiger’. West Tallaght for instance still suffers the poverty of ‘crumbling walls’ and 
‘damp bedrooms’ (Holland, 2005: 11). A recent-community based study in West 
Tallaght reported that this peripheral area had retained higher than average 
concentrations of unemployment, that one third of households were headed by lone 
parents and the risk of poverty posed to households remained high despite economic 
growth in the country generally (Axford et al., 2004). Moreover the invisibility of 
peripheral housing estates (Bartley, 1999) has been radically worsened given that they 
have become bound within the new corridors of flow comprising the network of 
transportation routes surrounding the outer city. 
In more recent years, the city has become divided into zones that are policed 
with distinct styles. Thus policing of the urban periphery has remained ‘confrontative’, 
in contrast to a more benign style in the city centre (Institute of Criminology, 2003). For 
as Bannon (1999) suggested, Dublin city has been developing both outwards in terms of 
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housing and industry, and at the same time concentrating commercial, office and 
residential development at the centre. This reorganisation of the division of labour 
between the core and periphery has come to be reflected in spatial variation in policing.
Thus the conversion of space into product (Lefebvre, 1991) has resulted in a 
new context for young people’s autonomous participation in public space. As the city 
centre becomes more of a consumption space it is to be enjoyed through market 
relations, e.g. shopping and the ‘night time economy’ involving drinking and clubbing 
(see Lovatt and O’Connor, 1995; Hobbs et al., 2000). Indeed, in the Dublin periphery, 
young people continue to be defined out of ‘community’ and find themselves debarred 
from generic community facilities that results in them creating cultural lives involving 
the use of the streets, the alleyways and the open areas (Lynch et al, 2005).
Since the IGUCD there has been considerable economic and cultural 
transformation in Ireland. Persistent unemployment, which had dogged the urban 
periphery for two decades, and was the cause of much of its failure as an experiment 
(Punch and MacLaran, 2004) has now been reduced. In this connection, youth crime 
prevention programmes have become part of the state’s ensemble of measures geared 
towards those most marginal to labour markets.22
Informational Capitalism and the Exclusive Society
The information age has replaced the industrial age as the predominant mode of 
development (Castells, 1989). It has become the major structuring and organising 
dynamic of our time such that cities have become to be ordered around the needs of the 
advanced service sector elites (Castells, 1996; 2000). 23Fundamentally, cities are based 
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upon the primacy of flows: this includes the flow of information both as raw materials 
and end product, together with the flow of people through transport corridors. The 
primacy of flows has divided cities in spaces of place (neighbourhoods) and spaces of  
flows (protected elite locales often expressed as gated communities and advanced 
service centres packaged for the new urban professional middle class). Hence the 
informational city has emerged as set of segregated spaces reflecting greater social 
polarisation in the occupational structure.
In this context, the growth of surveillance technologies has accompanied the 
growth in property ownership and the need to protect both goods themselves and the 
enjoyment and consumption of these goods. Jock Young (1999) has pointed out that the 
greater the risk posed to property the more those in possession begin to construct a city 
that is based on the systematic exclusion of others and more particularly that a growing 
capitalised private security industry blooms whose very economic output is the 
exclusion of those without labour or consumer market currency. The city, he suggested, 
has become a system of filters that upholds a regime of ‘sanitising and moralising 
geographies’ or a ‘cordon sanitaire’ (Young, 1999: 18-20). But the cordon sanitaire 
might also operate within working class communities to (re)stratify the pro-social and 
the anti-social and reconfigure governance in such a way as to bolster local elite groups 
who have access to some level of governing power.
A Contemporary Case Study of Youth Crime and Disorder Prevention: Contested 
Governance in Leevale-Campanile Hill24
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The Pinevale GYDP operates as part of a youth service [the Leevale-Campanile Hill 
Youth Project (LCHYP)] which is a local branch of a large youth organisation. The 
Pinevale Project covers two local authority housing estates of Leevale and Campanile 
Hill (LCH) that have a combined population of 7,000 persons. On my first ever contact 
as a researcher with the Pinevale Project in 1999, they had established a strict set of 
boundaries between themselves and the police: the youth workers were not involved in 
Garda affairs including community policing or responding to public order issues; police 
officers referred specific young people to the youth service from among those cautioned 
under the Youth Diversion Programme.25 
I returned to the area in 2004 and worked mainly alongside Rick, the GYDP co-
ordinator, for 12 weeks. By then, all of the original personnel had moved on; there was 
a tense and potentially violent environment surrounding the emerging cocaine trade; 
this pushed staff to work more in an outreach mode; and there was greater pressure put 
upon the staff at LCHYP by the police to revert to a form of high visibility, pro-police 
activity programme. By contrast, the Pinevale Project had developed a practice that 
centred upon creating dialogue with young people and used this as a platform to 
develop relationships. Morag, a senior colleague of Rick had sought to promote the idea 
of generating ‘youth voice’ as a means of improving young people’s participation in the 
public sphere so that their perspectives would be taken seriously by development 
agencies and institutions. However, the youth work staff worked in an environment that 
was increasingly hostile towards young people to the point that a coalition had emerged 
consisting of Council officials, local residents organisations, senior police officers and 
the local parish committee who ‘lord[ed]over the area’.26 Morag indicated in an 
impromptu interview that this powerful governing network had developed an 
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impenetrable discourse that stratified young people into ‘the good’ and ‘the scumbags’ 
which made it difficult to develop a pro-youth agenda. According to Morag, the ‘lords’ 
had been the major driving force for the erection of CCTV around the housing estates. 
During my time at LCH, the area had become dotted with these CCTV cameras.
While the youth workers at LCHYP understood and appreciated why local 
people wanted to feel safe, they remained unhappy that the CCTV cameras were 
erected. They continued with their dialogue with young people on the streets. This 
dialogue was therefore working against the consensual tide that was emerging in favour 
of digitised, technological solutions to young people’s use of public open space. While 
the CCTV scheme appeared to work from an in-built mistrust of young people, the 
Pinevale Project on the other hand had a tradition of promoting a ‘youth on the streets’ 
agenda: this was achieved through celebrating young people’s creativity and energy and 
giving voice to their concerns through drama, pageantry and the festive, especially 
around Halloween and other public occasions. In this local context, youth workers 
working within GYDPs were under continuing pressure to morph into crime 
preventionists which they actively contested and resisted.
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Conclusion: The Future of Youth Crime and Disorder Prevention?
Bouts of public disorder in the urban periphery, which was acutely devoid of social 
infrastructure, drove youth provision away from youth welfare in the direction of youth 
governance – i.e. concerned with the regulation of behaviour.27 It has been argued here 
that this has been influenced to a significant degree by the process of ‘glocalisation’. As 
time has advanced, the economic and cultural logics of globalisation have influenced 
the public sector institutions charged with managing Dublin City to the extent that the 
local authority has recently embraced an entrepreneurial ethic that has made it ‘pro-
developer’ in the gentrification of the City (Kelly and MacLaran, 2004: 51-52) This is 
in line with the idea that the city is being developed around a ‘growth machine’ in 
which key decisions are sought by elites so as that ‘urban fortunes’ can be made and 
unmade (Logan and Molotch, 1987).28 
The more that governing elites adopt a ‘liberal creed’ (O’Riain, 2004) the 
greater the need to reclaim space it seems. Coleman has suggested, based upon his 
study of Liverpool, that this dynamic is part of the roll-back of the welfare state and the 
roll-out of the neoliberal state where there is a struggle for ‘a hegemony of aesthetics 
regarding who and what should and should not be seen’ (Coleman, 2003: 32). Indeed, 
Kelly (2003: 177) has suggested that a re-imagining of youth as a dangerous Other 
reflects ‘an institutionalised mistrust of young people’ and as such risk management 
and disorder prevention strategies ‘emerge at the intersection of institutionalised 
imaginings of danger, risk and economy’. The ASBO and the Good Behaviour Contract 
have been offered as examples by British criminologists of ‘the progressive 
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criminalisation of marginalised youth’ based upon an ‘ever-expanding government 
machinery of “mistrust”’ (Stephen and Squires, 2004: 368). Together these ‘situational’ 
devices for reducing the supply of criminal opportunities are bound together with the 
emergence of digital surveillance that supports a neoliberal economic agenda (Graham 
and Wood, 2003: 243). The ASBO debate in Ireland during 2005 perhaps gave us an 
insight into the future as there appeared to be a political re-imagining of some as the 
dangerous Other (especially working class and marginal young people). The future may 
hold a greater degree of human and digital surveillance for these young people. This 
being the case, there is a greater onus on those working with young people in the 
housing estates to resist such tendencies and indeed there is a challenge to the young 
people themselves to claim their ‘right to the city’ (Lefebvre, 1996).
The case studies of Ballynew GYDP and the Pinevale Project at Leevale-
Campanile Hill presented in this essay suggest that practice in this domain is confronted 
with a choice between (i) the active engagement in constructing youth discipline 
through the participation in panoptic network governance; or (ii) the conscious and 
active contestation and resistance to the greater disciplining and surveillance of young 
people. In the latter form, youth work may survive intact as a distinct practice whilst in 
the former it has already hybridised and adapted to the emergence of a more punitive 
social order. Only a practice that recognises young people’s right to participate in the 
public sphere has transformative potential: by enabling young people’s voices to be 
heard above the vested interests, such a practice may become a means of radicalising 
and ultimately transforming social institutions.
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1 The British Crime and Disorder Act 1998 provided for ‘anti-social behaviour orders’ and the acronym 
ASBO quickly entered common use. It was the term used throughout the debate about the new criminal 
justice legislation in Ireland, including by the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform and the 
Minister. In the Criminal Justice Act 2006 as passed, however, the amendments to the Children Act 2001 
provide for what are called ‘Behaviour Orders’. 
2 One such programme is the Community Based CCTV Scheme inaugurated by the Department of 
Justice, Equality and Law Reform in 2005 (DJELR, 2005).
3 Some of these changes include new legislation restructuring policing; extending local authority 
structures to include some form of police accountability in the form of Joint Policing Committees under 
the Garda Siochána Act 2005; and the establishment of a Youth Justice Service in the Department of 
Justice, Equality and Law Reform (see Government of Ireland, 2006). See Hughes (2002) for a 
discussion of ‘community safety politics’ in Britain.
4 This article is based upon a wider research project exploring the relationships between state and civil 
society actors engaged in local level youth crime and disorder prevention programmes in urban Ireland. 
The data were gathered at three distinct time periods in 1998, 1999 and 2004-5. The research involved in-
depth interviewing with policy makers, practitioners, senior police personnel and practitioners. Interviews 
were archived for subsequent analysis. The earlier data were part of a study carried out at the Children’s 
Research Centre, Trinity College Dublin. The 2004-2005 module of the research was carried out at the 
Department of Sociology, Trinity College Dublin The research has been partly supported by the Third 
Sector Research Programme, Royal Irish Academy.
5 As pointed out earlier, there appears to be a consensus for this mode of governance in Ireland, reflected 
not least in the recommendations of the National Crime Council’s (2003) proposed national strategy on 
crime prevention.
6 In late modern society, according to this thesis, citizens are encouraged to become more self-provident 
as part of a cultural shift towards prudentialism and self- protection. Moreover, crime is considered to 
exist as a normal social fact or another late modern risk against which individuals and households can 
purchase protection from private security providers in the market. This is bound up with a heightened 
political consciousness about crime such that the state is forced into a series of adaptations. New forms of 
‘government at a distance’ have emerged in this context by virtue of the constriction of the penal-welfare 
state and rolling out of a more punitive orientation. Partnerships between state, private and civil society 
actors in this context ironically serve to extend the reach of state power to areas of social life far beyond 
government offices (see Garland, 1996; 2000; 2001).
7 Similarly, there has been a climb-down from implementing the provisions of the Act in relation to the 
age of criminal responsibility in that while it was to increase from seven to twelve years, it will now only 
be increased to ten years.
8 Fordism in the classic sense involves a ‘virtuous circle’ of production and consumption in which wage 
indexation is linked to productivity and so on. This is usually underpinned by a ‘social democratic 
welfare state’ (Peck and Tickell, 1994: 286). The Keynesian welfare state underpins the Fordist 
production paradigm by regulating the wage relation and directing demand in the economy together with 
supporting infrastructure and linking ‘the interests of organized capital and labour in a programme of full 
employment and social welfare’ (Jessop, 1994: 255). 
9 Despite recent increases in the city centre, the overall population trend in the Dublin County Borough 
(Dublin City) is downward. Taking 1971 as a base year, the Dublin City population declined by 4% 
between 1971 and 1981; and by 15.7% and 12.8% respectively for the decades 1981-1991 and 1991-2002 
(CSO, various years; see also Drudy 1991; Drudy and Punch 2000). The population of Fingal increased 
by 33% between 1981 and 1991 and continued to grow, increasing by a further 28% between 1991 and 
2002 (CSO Census of Population; Drudy, 1991; Drudy and MacLaran 1994; Drudy and Punch 2000; 
MacLaran 1993).
10 There are two caveats accompanying this data. Firstly, these areas are not officially enumerated using 
these categories of West Tallaght and North Clondalkin. Both of these derive from popular and 
commonplace usage. Secondly, District Electoral Division (DED) boundaries came into use only after the 
1981 Census. By then, North Clondalkin had a sizeable population relative to West Tallaght. Thus it was 
not possible to capture any surge in population for the former.
11 Tallaght West comprises the Tallaght DEDs of Jobstown, Killinarden and Fettercairn (see Punch 2002: 
64). These DEDs are those identified in West Tallaght Rapid Areas (see www.pobal.ie/rapid) and 
generally referred to in research reports (see for instance Axford et al., 2004: 8).
12 North Clondalkin comprises the Clondalkin DEDs of Cappaghmore, Moorfield, Rowlagh and 
Palmerstown West (North Clondalkin Community Development Project, 2001).
13 It has also been in decline since the 1980s (ibid).
14 Sunday Tribune, 24th November 1991
15 Historical Parliamentary Debates, Volume 413, 27 November 1991, Adjournment Debate, Dublin 
Juvenile Vandalism.
16 This observation is based upon interviews conducted with senior officials in the Department of Justice, 
Equality and Law Reform carried out in 1999. A fuller analysis of this data will be presented in 
subsequent publications by the author.
17 The report itself was written by an official who subsequently became the Director-General of the 
Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform. As such the text represents a governmental discourse 
and provides a telling insight into the interpretations and meanings that the Group attributed to the causes 
and outcomes of urban disorder. The Group were not given specific terms of reference and were asked to 
propose measures that would address ‘difficulties’. The Group reflects and represents the State in action: 
it was comprised of officials at a high level and there were no lay members or external expertise. There 
was no independent research commissioned. Hence, this was a purely state-driven exercise where the 
knowledge and understandings of state actors determined the eventual outcome.
18 I use the term pedagogic action as developed by Bourdieu in his foundation of the theory of symbolic 
violence. Pedagogic action is ‘the imposition of a cultural arbitrary by an arbitrary power’. Moreover: 
‘the symbolic strength of a pedagogic agency is defined by its weight in the structure of the power 
relations and symbolic relations (the latter always expressing the former) between the agencies exerting 
an action of symbolic violence. This structure in turn expresses the power relations between the groups or 
classes making up the social formation’ (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977: 7).
19 Give Ronanstown a Future Today (GRAFT) was set up jointly by the Ronanstown Youth Service, An 
Garda Siochana and the Probation and Welfare Service in 1991. It and a similar project in Killinarden, 
Tallaght evolved into Garda Special Projects by 1996 and such projects have been extended to at least 60 
locations around the country since 2000. For a more analytical account, see Bowden and Higgins 2000. 
After the publication of operational and practice guidelines, this scheme of projects became known as the 
Garda Youth Diversion Projects (GYDPs) (see Centre for Social and Educational Research, 2003).
20 This is connected to the new flexibilities and disciplines that are required in a post-Fordist order. John 
Lea (1997: 52) points out that in this connection: ‘Crime control thus becomes “actuarial”, concerned 
with risk assessment, incapacitation and the management of delinquency.  This takes a juridical – as 
opposed to a welfare – form, as it did in the early nineteenth century. But the object is less that of 
preparing the new working class, through the experience of penal discipline, for the “responsibility” 
required by labour for capital – factory discipline – and more that of introducing new flexibility, 
dismantling social rights and keeping the “underclass” under control. The relationship between the 
workfare state and actuarial criminal justice continues to be that of reciprocity; the criminal justice 
system picks up those who are unwilling to bend to the new flexibilities of the workfare state’.
21 This refers to a process whereby spaces once occupied by the dispersed working class have been 
gentrified and commodified for a new, globally connected middle class of city dwellers.
22 This was best exemplified by the incorporation of the GYDPs as a social inclusion labour market 
measure in the National Development Plan 2000-2006 (Government of Ireland, 1999).
23 The new informational capitalism according to Castells (1996) sets off occupational polarisation. 
According to Breathnach (2002) despite the conceptual idiosyncrasies of the concept of polarisation, 
there has been a ‘more definite tendency towards occupational, earnings and household income 
polarisation in the 1990s’ (Breathnach, 2002: 3). Indeed an updated analysis by Breathnach (2004) 
suggests that polarisation has been occurring in the occupational structure given the rise in professional 
jobs, the reduction in intermediate and skilled jobs and the rise of unskilled and undeclared occupations. 
24 This second case study is based upon a participant observation study carried out at the latter end of 
2004 in Leevale-Campanile Hill (LCH), a similar area socio-economically to Ballynew except closer to 
the city. 
25 The Youth Diversion Programme was introduced in An Garda Siochana in first as the Juvenile Liaison 
Officer Scheme in 1963. First introduced in the Dublin area, it was extended nationwide during the 
1990s. It has since been placed on a statutory footing by the provisions of the Children Act 2001.
26 There are parallels here between Morag’s term ‘lords’ and John Flint’s (2002) term ‘governors’.
27 That youth crime and disorder modalities began in the then ‘new towns’ was also a significant factor: 
firstly, because this was where most youth disorder occurred; and secondly, that there was no civic or 
municipal infrastructure to cope with the stresses of urban restructuring. These sites were also remote 
from the traditional working class organisations; and, grassroots activism was slow to emerge (see Punch, 
2002).
28 In this vein, land rezoning has come under parliamentary and judicial scrutiny in the last decade to the 
extent that the commingling of the political and economic elites over land deals has been of considerable 
public interest. Indeed, a former Minister for Justice, Mr. Ray Burke, has been judged to have received a 
‘corrupt payment’ from private property developers in 1989 for the purposes of supporting and 
‘influencing’ the planning status of lands in North Dublin (Flood J., 2002: 139-140). Moreover, 
redeveloping space no longer utilised for Fordist based production requires both ‘rescaling’ and 
‘reconversion’ (Swyngedouw, 1996). This involves the ‘reconversion’ of space evident in, for instance, 
the closing or rationalisation of industrial zones (such as Dublin port) and its ‘reconversion’ (ibid.) to a 
financial district; this process required a degree of institutional innovation on the part of the state (setting 
up of the Dublin Docklands Development Authority) together with the flexibilisation of the tax laws to 
facilitate the economic elite at senior levels in such developments (see ‘Bid to Flush Out Tax Avoidance’, 
Irish Times, 3rd February 2006). Internationally, such high visibility projects have been facilitated through 
processes that themselves occur ‘through the formation of new elite coalitions on the one hand and the 
systematic exclusion or further disempowerment of politically and / or economically already weaker 
social groups on the other’ (Swyngedouw, 1996: 1449).
